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Abstract
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the home-country eﬀects of
FDI. Instead of comparing FDI ﬁrms to non-FDI ﬁrms, we look at what happens
within multi-plant FDI ﬁrms and we compare headquarters to non-headquarter plants
belonging to the same ﬁrm. Using survey data on Italian industrial ﬁrms, we ﬁnd
that in FDI ﬁrms non-headquarter plants show a signiﬁcantly worse performance in
terms of employment and investment than headquarter plants. This suggests that the
home-country eﬀects of FDI tend to be biased in favour of headquarters.
JEL classiﬁcation: F20, F23, R30.
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roberta.zizza@bancaditalia.it.1 Introduction and related literature
The issue of foreign direct investment (FDI) has attracted extensive attention in recent
years. In particular, concerns about ﬁrms which reduce their workforce in the home coun-
try, while relocating production abroad, have been raised in the media, as well as in policy
circles. In order to investigate the home-country eﬀects of FDI, the academic literature
has followed two main approaches. A ﬁrst line of research estimates labour demand func-
tions for FDI ﬁrms in the home country and their foreign aﬃliates (Brainard and Riker
1997a, 1997b, Braconier and Ekholm 2000). Cross-wage elasticities then indicate the eﬀect
of wage changes in a foreign location on labour demand in the home country. A second
line of research compares the performance of FDI ﬁrms to the performance of a "control"
group of similar but non-FDI ﬁrms, using matching and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences techniques
(Egger and Pfaﬀermayr 2003, Barba Navaretti and Castellani 2004, Barba Navaretti et al.
2006, Debaere et al. 2006).
The two approaches share a signiﬁcant limitation. They consider each FDI ﬁrm in the
home country as a single unit. However, FDI ﬁrms usually tend to be large ﬁrms, often
controlling several plants in the home country. This paper argues that focusing on what
happens inside FDI ﬁrms, i.e. among their various plants at home, can yield interesting
insights. Speciﬁcally, we focus on a sample of Italian industrial multi-plant ﬁrms and make
a distinction between plants located in or close to the headquarters area ("HQ plants") and
plants located in Italy farther from the headquarters area ("non-HQ plants"). We then
compare employment or investments between HQ plants and non-HQ plants, for both FDI
ﬁrms and non-FDI ﬁrms. Our research question is the following: do HQ plants show
diﬀerent performances compared to non-HQ plants, and does FDI aﬀect these relative
performances?
This novel research question is - in our opinion - very interesting in several respects.
First, multi-plant ﬁrms are not an exception but rather a very widespread feature of in-
dustrial economies. For instance, in our sample, which includes only ﬁrms with at least 50
employees, multi-plant ﬁrms account for more than 60 per cent of employment, while they
2account for 78 per cent of employment and 88 per cent of output in the U.S. manufacturing
sector (Bernard and Jensen 2007).
Second, there are several reasons to expect diﬀerential eﬀects of FDI on HQ plants
versus non-HQ domestic plants. "Horizontal" FDI may increase the need for management
and coordination of foreign activities, which are typically carried out in the headquarters.
"Vertical" FDI may require a specialisation in skill-intensive activities, such as R&D,
product innovation and marketing, which are also often undertaken in the headquarters.
Third, the distribution of plants owned by ﬁrms having their headquarters in a diﬀerent
area is far from uniform in geographical terms. For example, as we shall see in the next sec-
tion, the South of Italy hosts a disproportionately higher number of plants owned by ﬁrms
headquartered in the Central and Northern areas. This feature, coupled with increasing
FDI by ﬁrms in the Central and Northern areas during the last decade, has indeed already
led to concerns about Mezzogiorno’s "dependence on external decision centres", which may
"translate into a vulnerability if there are shifts in the localisation advantages" (Svimez
2006, p. 51; our translation), i.e. if lower transport costs and better institutions make
it more convenient to move the production to foreign countries. By aﬀecting corporate
geography, FDI may therefore aﬀect also the overall geography of economic activity in the
home country.
Figure 1 provides a ﬁrst illustration of how the data on employment trends diﬀered
HQ plants and non-HQ plants. The ﬁgure reports the number of employees, in thousands
of units, of a balanced sample of Italian industrial multi-plant ﬁrms over the years 2001-
08. The left panel includes only FDI ﬁrms, which are deﬁned as ﬁrms producing abroad
through own foreign aﬃliates, while the right panel includes only non-FDI ﬁrms. Among
FDI ﬁrms, employment in HQ plants remained generally stable over the whole period, while
employment in non-HQ plants recorded a sharp decrease. By contrast, the group of non-
FDI ﬁrms shows a rather diﬀerent pattern, with non-HQ plants actually increasing over
time, and HQ employment which, again, remains unchanged. While the trend depicted in
the ﬁgure could be driven by many factors other than FDI, our formal econometric exercise
will show that it is robust to the inclusion of several ﬁrm and industry characteristics.
3Figure 2 broadly conﬁrms these patterns for investments, although the latter are obviously
much more volatile than employment. The only diﬀerence with respect to employment is
that non-HQ investments tend to fall compared to HQ investments not only for FDI ﬁrms
but also for non-FDI ﬁrms towards the end of the sample period.
Our paper is related to several branches of the literature. We have already mentioned
the literature based on the identiﬁcation of a control group of similar but non-FDI ﬁrms
which aims to estimate the eﬀect of FDI on investing ﬁrms. A potential drawback of this
approach is that, even if similar ex ante, these two groups of ﬁrms (FDI ﬁrms and the
control group of non-FDI ﬁrms) might show diﬀerent trends over time, and thus invalidate
the inference that can be drawn from their comparison. Since it looks at what happens
within ﬁrms, in our work this self-selection issue is instead largely attenuated. Plants
owned by the same ﬁrm are indeed, by deﬁnition, "exposed" to exactly the same FDI
"treatment", and they are also aﬀected by the same ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks.
Our paper is also related to recent work carried out by Bernard and Jensen (2007).
They compare the likelihood of plant closure in single-plant, multi-plant and FDI ﬁrms.
They ﬁnd that plants owned by FDI ﬁrms are unconditionally less likely to close. However,
if one controls for plant and industry characteristics, the opposite result is observed: FDI
ﬁrms are actually more, and not less, likely to shut down a domestic plant. FDI ﬁrms
seem therefore to have greater ﬂexibility in labour adjustments than non-FDI ﬁrms. Our
paper adds a further perspective to this issue by showing that FDI ﬁrms have diﬀerent
employment trends in HQ compared to non-HQ plants.
Finally, our paper can be put in connection with recent empirical evidence for the U.S.
which shows that layoﬀs and divestitures are more likely to happen, or happen earlier, in
divisions farther from headquarters (Landier et al. 2009); the cited paper digs deeper into
the mechanisms behind these trends, and ﬁnds that they could be due either to information
or social factors, but does not make any distinction between FDI and non-FDI ﬁrms.
The rest of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents data and the economet-
ric methodology, while the empirical results are reported in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
42 Data and methodology
Our investigation is based on data drawn from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of industrial
ﬁrms (INVIND; Banca d’Italia 2007), which is run annually from the early ’80s on a
representative sample of Italian ﬁrms. The Survey represents one of the richest sources of
information at ﬁrm level for Italy, and its use is today quite widespread in the literature
(Banca d’Italia 2008).
The sample is composed of ﬁrms with at least 50 employees in the industrial sector net
of construction (corresponding to sections C, D and E in the NACE rev. 1 classiﬁcation).
In 2006 the survey included an additional set of questions on their international activity.
The following question, in particular, allows us to identify FDI ﬁrms: "In 2000-2006 did
you produce goods and services abroad? (through ownership/control of foreign ﬁrms,
ownership of local production units without separate legal status)".
We also exploit data on the distribution of workforce and of total ﬁxed investments by
geographical area within the home country (North-West, North-East, Centre, South), as
well as information on the location of headquarters. To give an example, for a hypothetical
ﬁrm "CFZ & Co." we observe that its headquarter is located in the North-West of Italy,
that 30 per cent of its total employment is in that area and that the ﬁrm is also active
in the three other geographical areas (North-East, Centre, South) with respectively 22, 43
and 5 per cent of employment. We are thus able to make a distinction between single-area
ﬁrms (single-plant ﬁrms or multi-plant ﬁrms whose plants are all located in the same area
as their headquarters) and multi-area ﬁrms (multi-plant ﬁrms with plants in at least two
diﬀerent areas). We will mainly concentrate on multi-area ﬁrms, for which we are able
to compare plants located in the HQ area (HQ plants) to plants located in non-HQ areas
(non-HQ plants).
Data referred to 2006 have been linked to previous and subsequent surveys covering the
2001-08 period. We end up with an unbalanced panel of 1,438 ﬁrms, accounting for more
than 600,000 employees (table 1); among these ﬁrms, 250 have direct investments abroad
and 304 have plants in more than one geographical area. This translates into a number of
51,891 ﬁrms-areas. The share of multi-area ﬁrms is not very high - slightly more than a ﬁfth
- in terms of the number of ﬁrms, but this ﬁgure doubles when one looks at the number of
ﬁrm-areas, and triples when the number of employees is taken into account.
Our sample represents 12.1 per cent of the total workforce in the industrial sector net
of construction. Compared to the reference population of ﬁrms with at least 50 employees,
our sample is even more representative (28.2 per cent in terms of employment, table 2).
The sample breakdown by geographical area shows that the share of employment in the
South of Italy is much higher if it is considered by location of plants rather than by location
of headquarters, because of the presence in the South of a high number of plants owned
by ﬁrms headquartered in the Central and Northern areas (table 3).
As anticipated in our introduction, many contributions to the literature deal with the
assessment of FDI eﬀects on either domestic employment or investments (or both). Results
from these contributions usually suﬀer from a selection bias, since ﬁrms investing abroad
are likely to be "special" in many regards - as a whole we can say that they are usually
the best performing ones - and hence cannot be fairly compared with those non investing
abroad. Here, instead, we want to assess whether in multi-plant ﬁrms the event of investing
abroad translates into diﬀerent behaviours in terms of investing or hiring/ﬁring personnel
in non-HQ branches if compared to HQ plants. In this regard, the comparison is within
ﬁrm but across plants.
Our preferred speciﬁcation is the following panel regression for multi-area ﬁrms over
the 2001-08 period:
yi,j,t = β0 + β1nohqi,j + β2fdii + β3nohqi,j ∗ fdii + β4cui,t + βzZ + ǫi,j,t (1)
where the dependent variable y is the log level of employment (or investments) in plants
located in area j and owned by multi-area ﬁrm i in the year t. nohq is a dummy, equal
to one if the area j is not the area where ﬁrm is headquartered (non-HQ plants) and
equal to zero if ﬁrm is headquartered in area j (HQ plants); fdi is a dummy equal to one
for an FDI ﬁrm, zero for a non-FDI ﬁrm; nohq*fdi is the interaction between nohq and
6fdi. Therefore, since we are mainly interested in evaluating employment and investment
performance of non-headquarter plants compared to headquarter plants in the case of FDI
ﬁrms, we compare the two groups nohq = 1 and fdi = 1 versus nohq = 0 and fdi = 1. Our
coeﬃcient of interest is hence the sum of β1 and β3.1
Moreover, in the regressions we include the capacity utilisation rate (cu), which is aimed
to capture ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-varying shocks. Finally, the vector Z contains additional
controls. In particular, we control for: the lagged value of the dependent variable (to take
into account serial correlation in employment or investments); ownership structure (if ﬁrms
are owned by a national or foreign group) and corporate events (mergers and acquisitions,
spin-oﬀs, transfer of assets); region, industry and time dummies (to take into account
unobserved area, sector and time speciﬁc heterogeneity). All standard errors are clustered
by ﬁrms so as to control for standard error bias with aggregate observations (Moulton
1990). A list of our dependent and main explanatory variables with corresponding summary
statistics is reported in table 4.
3 Results
This section presents the results of a set of regressions run to evaluate the eﬀect of FDI
on employment in non-HQ plants, compared to HQ plants. As the dependent variable
is the log of employment, and its lagged value appears among the regressors, changes of
employment at the extensive margin, i.e. the shift to zero (or from zero to a positive value)
of employment, due to closures or openings of all plants in a given geographical area, are
not considered. However, this should not be regarded as a matter of concern as the share
of employment aﬀected by ﬁrm entry and exit in a given area is rather negligible: entry
and exit involve on average respectively 7 and 5 per cent of the observations, but only
0.3 per cent of employment in both cases (table 5). The small incidence of the extensive
1Substituting for each of the two groups their respective dummy values, 0 or 1, we have that for the
group fdi = 1 and nohq = 1, it holds β0 + β1 + β2 + β3; for the group fdi = 1 and nohq = 0, it holds
β0 + 0 + β2 + 0. Thus, if we want to measure, among the FDI ﬁrms, the diﬀerential eﬀect on non-HQ
plants versus HQ plants we should look at the algebraic diﬀerence between the two expressions, and thus
at β1 + β3.
7margin mainly reﬂects the structure of our data, which are not at plant level, but at a
more aggregate ﬁrm-area level: this implies that, for instance, the closure of one plant is
included in the log level of employment as long as there are other plants owned by the
same ﬁrm and located in the same area; in a similar way, the opening of a new plant is
taken account of if the parent ﬁrm already owned other plants in the same area.
According to our baseline speciﬁcation, estimated on multi-area ﬁrms only (table 6,
column (1)), ceteris paribus employment is signiﬁcantly lower in non-HQ plants; the coef-
ﬁcient on the variable fdi is positive and signiﬁcant. The interpretation of the interactions
between dummies is not straightforward. We are mainly interested in the employment
performance of non-HQ plants, compared to HQ plants, among FDI ﬁrms. Therefore, we
should consider the sum of the coeﬃcients on variables nohq and nohq*fdi, which turns
out to be negative and jointly signiﬁcant, as shown by the corresponding F-test. This sug-
gests that in non-HQ plants employment is signiﬁcantly lower than in HQ plants, and this
eﬀect is twice as large in FDI ﬁrms. The results on the other main explanatory variables
are consistent with our priors: employment is strongly correlated with its lagged value (its
coeﬃcient is .972) and tends to grow more in ﬁrms with higher rates of capacity utilisation.
The estimated eﬀect on our variables of interest seems rather signiﬁcant in quantitative
terms. The sum of nohq*fdi (-0.032) and nohq (-0.030) yields -0.062. This means that in
FDI ﬁrms employment in non-HQ plants is on average 6.2 per cent lower than in the HQ
plants of the same ﬁrm every year. The aggregate eﬀect is also sizeable since multi-area
FDI ﬁrms account for more than one third of total employment in our sample.
One could argue that in the case of non-HQ plants the presence of foreign investments
reduces employment as low-skill labour activities shift towards low-cost labour countries.
In the case of headquarters, this presence has a positive eﬀect on employment, because
of the increased need for coordination and management activities due to delocalisation
abroad, and/or because of the increased specialisation in headquarter activities such as
R&D and marketing.
In order to assess whether the eﬀect varied across time we repeated the estimation
8on two sub-periods, before and after 2005, thus broadly halving the sample. The eﬀect
is concentrated in the ﬁrst period, and can be put in connection with the stagnation of
economic activity in the years 2002-03 which is likely to have induced an adjustment in
the employment levels.
These results appear to be robust to changes in speciﬁcations along diﬀerent dimen-
sions. First, we introduce a broader deﬁnition of "investing abroad", creating a new dummy
variable broad fdi, which includes also ﬁrms declaring to have major technical collaboration
agreements with foreign ﬁrms. A ﬁrm can indeed produce abroad not only through its own
foreign aﬃliates (FDI), but also through independent suppliers (international outsourcing).
While fdi captures only the former, broad fdi includes also the latter. The interaction term
nohq*broad fdi is calculated accordingly (column (2)). Second, we include an indicator of
the level of skill involved in the production, proxied by the share of white collars (skill),
and the expenditure in R&D as a share of turnover (R&D); this is meant to assess whether
a "genuine" non-HQ eﬀect is at work, not entirely overlapping with the workforce recom-
position of the exporting ﬁrms towards positions with a higher skill content (column (3)).
Third, we run the regression on the subsample of FDI ﬁrms only, which halves the number
of observations (column (4)), as well as on the whole sample, i.e. including in the sample
both the plants of multi-area ﬁrms and the plants of single-area ﬁrms (column (5)). In
this latter case, on the one hand, the coeﬃcients on the industry and area dummies are
likely be estimated with more precision; on the other hand, we might introduce a bias as
the units of observation are now less homogeneous.
The coeﬃcients of the variable nohq are always negative and signiﬁcant; those referring
to the variable fdi are positive and signiﬁcant except in the regression performed adding the
indicators of the skill levels; the coeﬃcients for the interaction variable nohq*fdi are always
negative, although not always statistically diﬀerent from zero. Summing the coeﬃcient for
the interaction term nohq*fdi and the coeﬃcient for the base eﬀect nohq (or simply looking
at the coeﬃcient for nohq when the sample is composed only of ﬁrms with FDI (column (4))
leads to estimates of the eﬀect which range between -5.4 and -8.3 per cent. The inclusion
of the variable accounting for skill composition - whose coeﬃcient emerges as negative and
9signiﬁcant - reinforces our results, as the negative impact of FDI for non-HQ plants is even
higher in absolute terms.
Furthermore, for multi-area ﬁrms only, we estimate the same model for the log-level of
employment using two techniques which are alternative to OLS (using both the "narrow"
and the "broad" measures of FDI, table 7). We have, in turn, either introduced random
eﬀects at ﬁrm-area level (columns (1) and (2)) or implemented a system-GMM estimation
(columns (3) and (4)), where the instrument for the equation in ﬁrst-diﬀerences is the
lagged level of the dependent variable dated t − 2, and the instrument for the equation
in levels is the lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the dependent variable. Our results are broadly
conﬁrmed. The sum of the coeﬃcients on variables nohq and nohq*fdi turns out to be
always negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In FDI ﬁrms, employment in non-
HQ plants is on average between 11 and 26 per cent lower in the four speciﬁcations. Caveats
are needed for the GMM estimation as it barely passes the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions.
Tables 8 and 9 present results for the same set of regressions estimated so far, except
that we now consider (log) investments as the dependent variable. As for employment,
foreign investments are associated to lower investments in non-HQ plants. Now the coef-
ﬁcient for the interaction term nohq*fdi, measuring the diﬀerential among non-HQ plants
between FDI and non-FDI ﬁrms, is positive, though not statistically signiﬁcant in columns
(1) and (3). However, as also suggested by Figure 2, this result reﬂects the behaviour of
non-FDI ﬁrms, whose accumulation activity reduces over time irrespective of corporate
structure status, whilst for FDI ﬁrms we ﬁnd a clear diﬀerential eﬀect between HQ and
non-HQ plants: as shown in column (4) of Table 8, non-HQ plants, among FDI ﬁrms,
invest 21 per cent less than their headquarters. The results on the other main explanatory
variables are largely expected: investments are less persistent than employment, as shown
by the smaller coeﬃcient of the lagged value (.785 in column (1) of the OLS estimates).
Capacity utilisation rates show again a positive sign, which is nonetheless signiﬁcant only
when the whole sample is considered. Diﬀerently from what we observed for employment,
the eﬀect of non-HQ plants on investments is negative and signiﬁcant both before and after
102005, although stronger in the ﬁrst subperiod.
Finally, one might also wonder about the extent of total eﬀect of FDI on domestic
employment and accumulation activity. With the caveat that the FDI status is far from
being an exogenous variable, our estimates lead to the conclusion that the eﬀect is nil for
employment and positive for investments.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper provides an empirical contribution to the literature on home-country eﬀects of
FDI. We start by noticing that the existing literature usually treats each FDI ﬁrm as a
single unit. However, this assumption is too restrictive if, as it is often the case, FDI ﬁrms
are not single-plant ﬁrms, but control instead several plants in their home country. We
argue that ignoring how ﬁrms allocate their workforce among their own plants in the home
country, and how this choice relates to FDI strategies, hides interesting patterns that fully
deserve to be analysed.
Using survey data on Italian industrial multi-plant ﬁrms, we therefore introduce a
distinction between headquarters or plants which are located close the headquarters (HQ
plants) and plants located farther from the headquarters (non-HQ plants). Our most
conservative estimate indicates that, among FDI ﬁrms, employment in non-HQ plants
decreases annually by at least 5.4 per cent more than in the headquarter plants of the
same ﬁrm.
These ﬁndings could be properly explained in the context of "horizontal" FDI as well
as "vertical" FDI. Both models predict that HQ activities would increase after FDI, rela-
tively to non-HQ activities, reﬂecting the need for management and coordination of foreign
activities in the "horizontal" model, and the specialisation in skill-intensive activities such
as R&D, product innovation and marketing in the "vertical" one. More generally, these
ﬁndings are also consistent with results available in the literature, which show that layoﬀs
and divestitures are more frequent or happen earlier in divisions farther from headquarters.
Further research is needed in order to discriminate between these competing hypotheses.
11Overall, our results imply that, by aﬀecting corporate geography, FDI may have an
impact on the geography of economic activity in the home country, with important conse-
quences for local policy makers. Another implication, which also needs to be analysed in
future research, is that, if headquarters tend to be located in urban areas (Davis and Hen-
derson 2008), further increases in FDI activity will determine changes in the agglomeration
patterns in favour of larger cities.
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14Appendix: tables and ﬁgures
Table 1: Sample
Multi-area ﬁrms Total sample
ﬁrms ﬁrms- employees ﬁrms ﬁrms- employees
areas areas
2002 195 481 301,770 877 1,164 468,999
2003 197 486 315,302 968 1,257 492,548
2004 224 554 320,538 1,076 1,406 512,760
2005 258 632 328,031 1,210 1,528 533,557
2006 304 757 363,577 1,438 1,891 603,653
2007 302 751 350,543 1,365 1,814 581,012
2008 279 703 343,905 1,171 1,595 543,918
of which: FDI ﬁrms
2002 58 147 194,464 167 256 246,096
2003 65 169 205,660 184 288 260,117
2004 72 185 195,862 203 316 255,133
2005 80 200 193,781 221 341 255,691
2006 91 239 219,200 250 398 286,930
2007 86 232 211,751 243 389 279,476
2008 85 224 206,984 214 353 266,131
15Table 2: Sample ﬁrms’ representativeness in 2006 (1)
Number of ﬁrms % share
Area ﬁrms employment
North West 377 7.7 25.0
North East 308 7.0 18.8
Center 328 27.0 58.2
South and Islands 425 30.7 34.5
Italy 1,438 12.1 28.2
(1) By location of headquarter. Shares are computed on the reference population of ﬁrms in the
industrial sector (net of construction) with at least 50 employees.
Table 3: Sample geographical distribution
ﬁrms employment
Area by HQ by plant
area area
North West 26.2 39.8 33.3
North East 21.4 21.9 24.4
Center 22.8 26.7 19.2
South and Islands 29.6 11.7 23.0
Italy 100.0 100.0 100.0
16Table 4: Summary statistics: multi-area ﬁrms
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Employment 532.46 1,565.8 0.41 23,664 4,364
Investments 13.2 76.76 0 1737.06 4,336
∆t−1(employment) -6.91 194.79 -5,247.84 2,118.81 4,364
∆t−1(investments) 0.23 31.77 -613.93 1,132.26 4,336
nohq 0.6 0.49 0 1 4,364
fdi 0.32 0.47 0 1 4,364
broad fdi 0.38 0.49 0 1 4,364
nohq*fdi 0.2 0.4 0 1 4,364
nohq*broad fdi 0.23 0.42 0 1 4,364
capacity utilization 0.81 0.13 0 1 4,364
Notes: employment is measured in units and investments in millions of euro. All statistics are
computed at the ﬁrm-area level.
17Table 5: Entry and exit
Entry Exit
% obs. % empl. % obs. % empl.
2002 6.78 0.15 6.36 0.29
2003 7.92 0.59 7.47 0.30
2004 8.29 0.28 4.82 0.33
2005 8.02 0.56 4.91 0.48
2006 5.76 0.37 3.79 0.21
2007 7.43 0.23 3.79 0.29
2008 6.29 0.33 4.87 0.54
Average 2002-08 7.14 0.34 4.95 0.34
Notes: The table reports the percentage share of entry and exit on the sample of multi-area ﬁrms,
in terms of number of observations and employees. Entry is deﬁned as the observations (ﬁrm i in
area j) with zero employees in year t − 1 and at least one employee in year t. Exit is deﬁned as
the observations with at least one employee in year t − 1 and zero employees in year t. For exit,
the share on employment is computed using one-year lagged employment.
18Table 6: The impact of FDI on employment: OLS estimates
FDI Whole
Multi-area ﬁrms ﬁrms sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(empl)t−1 0.972*** 0.972*** 0.968*** 0.972*** 0.975***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004)
nohq -0.030** -0.033** -0.040** -0.081*** -0.034***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.010)
fdi 0.024* 0.013 0.015**
(0.014) (0.018) (0.006)






cu 0.182*** 0.183*** 0.208*** 0.136 0.135***




Tests of joint signiﬁcance:
nohq+nohq*fdi=0 or nohq+nohq*broad fdi=0
F(1,441) = 10.84 F(1,441) = 9.47 F(1,403) = 9.14 F(1,1713) = 11.12
p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00
Observations 4,364 4,364 3,229 2,341 10,711
R2 0.976 0.976 0.974 0.976 0.975
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) number of employees of ﬁrm i in area j at time t.
All columns include year, three-digit industry, area, headquarter region ﬁxed eﬀects and a set of
variables accounting for the ownership structure and for mergers and acquisitions. All columns
are estimated by OLS. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the ﬁrm level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
19Table 7: The impact of FDI on employment: alternative methods
random eﬀects gmm-sys
(ﬁrm-area)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(empl)t−1 0.945*** 0.944*** 0.865*** 0.864***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.040) (0.041)
nohq -0.088*** -0.094*** -0.249*** -0.259***





broad fdi 0.045*** 0.091***
(0.016) (0.031)
nohq*broad fdi -0.018 0.022
(0.022) (0.034)
cu 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.209*** 0.207***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.077) (0.077)
Tests of joint signiﬁcance:
nohq+nohq*fdi=0 or nohq+nohq*broad fdi=0
X2(1)=23.71 X2(1)=21.68 X2(1)=9.80 X2(1)=9.63
p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00
Test overid. restrictions Hansen test
X2(48)=59.12 X2(48)=58.89
p-value=0.013 p-value=0.013
Observations 4,364 4,364 4,364 4,364
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) number of employees of ﬁrm i in area j at time t.
All columns include year, industry, area, headquarter region ﬁxed eﬀects and a set of variables
accounting for the ownership structure and for mergers and acquisitions; industry ﬁxed eﬀects
are at the three-digit level in columns (1)-(2), at the two-digit level in columns (3)-(4). Columns
(1)-(2) are estimated with random eﬀect with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the ﬁrm
level. Columns (3)-(4) are estimated with system GMM. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
20Table 8: The impact of FDI on investments: OLS estimates
FDI Whole
Multi-area ﬁrms ﬁrms sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(inv)t−1 0.785*** 0.785*** 0.757*** 0.770*** 0.767***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.011)
nohq -0.316*** -0.335*** -0.416*** -0.212*** -0.244***
(0.049) (0.055) (0.066) (0.045) (0.044)
fdi 0.116** 0.093 0.146***
(0.054) (0.072) (0.030)






cu 0.149 0.150 0.266 0.208 0.551***





Tests of joint signiﬁcance:
nohq+nohq*fdi=0 or nohq+nohq*broad fdi=0
F(1,434) = 16.96 F(1,434) = 20.75 F(1,395) = 13.64 F(1,1689) = 6.63
p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00 p-value=0.01
Observations 3,065 3,065 2,195 1,970 9,210
R2 0.859 0.859 0.842 0.835 0.747
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) level of investments of ﬁrm i in area j at time t.
All columns include year, three-digit industry, area, headquarter region ﬁxed eﬀects and a set of
variables accounting for the ownership structure and for mergers and acquisitions. All columns
are estimated by OLS. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the ﬁrm level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
21Table 9: The impact of FDI on investments: alternative methods
random eﬀects gmm-sys
(ﬁrm-area)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(inv)t−1 0.681*** 0.683*** 0.398*** 0.402***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.067) (0.067)
nohq -0.492*** -0.511*** -0.935*** -0.983***





broad fdi 0.150** 0.343***
(0.065) (0.109)
nohq*broad fdi 0.199** 0.450***
(0.080) (0.165)
cu 0.232 0.231 0.304 0.285
(0.179) (0.179) (0.202) (0.204)
Tests of joint signiﬁcance:
nohq+nohq*fdi=0 or nohq+nohq*broad fdi=0
X2(1)=21.21 X2(1)=26.46 X2(1)=12.56 X2(1)=14.98
p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00 p-value=0.00
Test overid. restrictions Hansen test
X2(41)=60.93 X2(41)=61.26
p-value=0.023 p-value=0.022
Observations 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) level of investments of ﬁrm i in area j at time t.
All columns include year, industry, area, headquarter region ﬁxed eﬀects and a set of variables
accounting for the ownership structure and for mergers and acquisitions; industry ﬁxed eﬀects
are at the three-digit level in columns (1)-(2), at the two-digit level in columns (3)-(4). Columns
(1)-(2) are estimated with random eﬀects with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the ﬁrm
level. Columns (3)-(4) are estimated with system GMM. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Source: Authors’ calculations on a balanced sample of multi−area firms. The figure shows the overall
number of employees in the headquarter area (HQ) and in no−headquarter areas (NOHQ).
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Source: Authors’ calculations on a balanced sample of multi−area firms. The figure shows the overall
level of investments in the headquarter area (HQ) and in no−headquarter areas (NOHQ).
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